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South Africa is a society emerging from a chequered and troubled past with a legacy of 
impairments in terms of education skills, opportunities, resentments, equality and 
perceptions. As in many societies, corruption is recognized as a major hindrance to good 
governance in the public sector. The South African government has prompted the public 
sector to focus on anti-corruption measures as part of their mechanisms to prevent and curb 
corruption. It is evident that these mechanisms are insufficient to prevent and curb 
corruption, due to poor governance practices, such as weakness and gaps in legislation. 
Furthermore, the public sector has seen that there are unethical and even toxic leaders, who 
exploit the loopholes in the systems and processes and seek to fulfil their personal desires at 
the expense of their departments. It is therefore argued that there is increasingly a need for 
ethical leadership in the public sector. This article therefore suggests the need for ethical 
leadership to prevent and curb corruption and to promote good governance in the 
S.A. public sector. Ethical leadership is associated with leader effectiveness and good 
governance. Leaders need to demonstrate ethical leadership in their daily behaviors, 
decisions and actions. By sending out strong messages about ethics and establishing clear 
reward and sanction systems to hold public sector employees accountable for their actions, 
leaders can do a lot to promote good governance in the public sector. This may need to be 
linked to values inherent in certain uniquely cultural and South African traditions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
With a population of just over 50 million, South Africa (S.A.) has extensive gold, 
platinum, coal and other mineral resources, well-developed financial, legal, 
communications, energy, transport and mining sectors, an established 120 year-old 
stock exchange, and reliable transport, energy and communications infrastructures. 
South Africa has a fully functional judicial and legislative system (based on long 
established Roman-Dutch legal principles), with extensive legislation governing 
commerce, labor, social and property issues as well as laws and regulations associated 
with agencies overseeing competition, copyright, and communications policies, 
conform to international norms and conventions. The population comprises various 
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cultural, ethnic and racial backgrounds (e.g. the population largely derives from 
European extraction and indigenous African tribes), also has 11 official languages, (and 
scores of unofficial ones). Although English is the most commonly spoken language in 
commerce, it is only the fifth most spoken ‘home’ language. The country's democratic 
Constitution, recognizes all 11 official languages, to which the state guarantees equal 
status. 
The country's financial systems are sophisticated and robust, surviving the 2008 
financial crisis relatively intact with extensive banking and financial services regulation 
and policing. Since the advent of democracy in 1994, tax compliance has steadily 
improved and the revenue service (S.A.R.S) prides itself on innovative e-filing and digital 
applications to speed-up tax submissions, as well as an efficient turn-around for the 
country’s growing tax base. South Africa is - until 2015 - eligible for preferential trade 
benefits under the U.S. African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), and the two 
countries have a bilateral tax treaty eliminating double taxation. 
South Africa is a member of the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World 
Bank, G-20, World Trade Organization, and Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, and recently (2011) became the 5th constituent of the so-called ‘BRICS’ 
emerging nations trade grouping, thereby joining the rapidly growing economies of 
Brazil, Russia, India and China. South Africa’s GDP growth in 2011 was 3.1%. 
However, there are many socio-economic problems, such as high unemployment 
(officially 25%), illiteracy, and certain areas of the public sector – such as the health 
service and local government (divided into 9 geographical provinces), that often 
function poorly, and are frequently characterized by ill-informed uncaring public 
officials. Recently the Public Service and Administration Minister announced a 
programme to professionalize the public service by introducing compulsory induction 
training from October 2013, (Aboobaker, S., 2012). 
Recognizing the need for improvement, and following six months of nationwide 
public consultation, a draft long-term vision and strategic plan for South Africa has 
recently been devised by government. This road-map – The National Development 
Plan-2030 – sets down strategies to address poverty by broadening access to 
employment, strengthening the social wage, improving public transport and raising 
rural incomes, and crucially in terms of the focus of this article, outlines the steps that 
need to be taken by the state to strengthen accountability, improve coordination and 
prosecute corruption in the public service. 
Although S.A. ranked 54th out of the 178 countries listed in Transparency 
International’s 2010 Corruption perceptions index, South Africa’s Auditor-General 
(AGSA) – with a constitutional mandate to ensure oversight, accountability and 
governance in the public sector, uncovered R26,4bn in “unauthorised, irregular and 
fruitless expenditure” in his review of S.A. government and public sector departments 
during the 2010/2011 financial year (De Lange 2011). 
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The AGSA – which celebrated its centenary of public sector auditing in 2011 – audits 
8 metropolitan, 283 municipalities and a further 60 local government entities annually, 
within 3 months from receipt. On average, about 50 % achieved a clean financially 
unqualified audit (S2.2.2) after correction conform to pre-determined objectives or 
misstatements, within the audit period, with the remainder tarnished by various 
“negative disclaimers, adverse findings or qualified opinions.” The key drivers of failed 
audit outcomes include deficiencies in internal controls, poor HR, and problematic I.T., 
as well as by oversight committees which the AGSA attributes to: 
 
a) Officials in key positions lack minimum required skills and competencies (72%); 
b) Lack of consequences for poor performance and transgressions by officials and 
leaders (70%); 
c) Mayors and councillors do not timeously respond to requests from the AG for 
information/corrections and fail to “take ownership of the implementation of 
key controls,” (57%) (S2.1.5). 
 
The AGSA notes that “numerous errors need to be corrected by auditors during the 
audit despite consultants being brought in to assist municipalities, and that some were 
submitted too late to be completed in the time period,” (AGSA Report, 2012). Overall, 
the AGSA opines that drivers of audit outcomes are “that leadership should set the tone 
from the top regarding the importance of internal controls and expected standards of 
conduct” and that for the purposes of corrective action, the different components of 
internal control are categorised as leadership, financial and performance management 
and governance” – the drivers of internal control (AGSA Report, 2012, 4.1.1), Heese and 
Allan (2012:4). Somewhat ironically, the S.A. Public Protector, (mandated to investigate 
corruption in public administration), noted that there would soon be no money left for 
service delivery in SA, due to the alarming increase in corruption in government 
departments in the public sector (Madonsela 2011). 
Although the shift from the stigma of apartheid, (which excluded the majority of 
South Africans from ownership and/or control of productive assets and resources and 
participation in the economy), to democracy in 1994, was achieved relatively peacefully, 
many organizations remain hierarchical in structure, while industrial and employee 
relations are often characterized festering resentments (and on occasion simmering 
violence, most recently apparent in an aggressive dispute between a private sector 
mining company, its employees, competing trade unions, and police intervention, 
(Paton and Seccombe 2012), Although legislation aimed at promoting economic 
transformation and eliminating resentment was introduced almost a  decade ago, its 
record in relation to equalizing the wealth of ordinary workers has been patchy: average 
annual incomes for most blue collar and public sector employee remains stubbornly 
below R 50,000 p.a. (= 4,500 UK pounds = $ 7,000 (BMR 2010). 
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The Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) Act of 2003, targets sectors areas of the 
South African economy, such as energy, banking, and mineral beneficiation. These key 
development areas have specific criteria attached to measure more broadly-based 
economic participation outcomes, such as equality of ownership, increased 
employment, more equitable income distribution, opportunity and access to services. 
In February 2007 the Codes of Good Practice on Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) were formalized by the government to provide a clear 
framework to measure broad-based BEE across sectors of the economy. The Codes 
define criteria and quantify seven scorecard categories: Ownership, Management, 
Employment Equity, Skills Development, Preferential Procurement, Enterprise and 
Socio-Economic Development. 
The advantages of being BEE-compliant are access to the Department of Trade and 
Industry B-BBEE Opportunities Network to assist businesses to tender for preferential 
procurement and or enterprise development opportunities – typically in the form of 
tenders for government contracts. 
However, circumvention of the B-BBEE Act and Codes has led to a process termed 
‘Fronting,’ involving deliberate attempts to falsify and misrepresent scorecard data 
regarding compliance, and typically involve such practices as ‘window-dressing,’ in 
which a few formerly economically black/disadvantaged people are nominally 
appointed to prominent positions (e.g. as directors/managers) in an enterprise on the 
basis of tokenism, while the rest of the organization remains ‘business as usual,’ all with 
the objective of appearing BEE-compliant. The Public Protector (January 2012) referred 
to so-called ‘tenderpreneurs,’ who participate in public procurement self- enrichment 
schemes and treat government funds as ‘orphaned money’. The Public Protector said 
that those involved in such schemes “make use of personal connections to the powerful 
to score lucrative government contracts, often benefiting from inflated fees while 
delivering shoddy service. Pseudo entrepreneurs collude with public officials and office 
bearers to deprive citizens, not only of enormous resources but also of service delivery,” 
(Madonsela, T. 2012). 
In a prominently quoted speech, Gwede Mantashe, the secretary-general of the 
governing party (the ANC), warned against BEE companies using the state as their ‘cash 
cow’ by providing poor-quality goods at inflated prices. He said it was unacceptable for 
contractors to charge taxpayers R20 million for a public school, when the private sector 
might only spend half the cost on a similarly specified project. Questioning the country’s 
tender system, Mantashe noted the need to move away from a ‘tender state’, to a state 
that actually has capacity to do business: “The state must be able to do what it has to 
do and never make secondary, what has to be a primary objective.” He stated that if the 
primary objective of the state is to “deliver food to a school, who delivers it, is 
secondary.” He concluded that the public had for too long tolerated the situation where 
BEE companies build bridges that got ‘eroded at the first rainfall,’ (Mantashe, G., 2012). 
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Although neither the Public Protector nor Mantashe actually used the term 
‘corruption’ to describe these scenarios, not everyone’s perception might regard such 
schemes as corrupt. As noted by Jos (1993) and others, empirical studies of corruption 
depend on exactly where one is ‘standing.’ Some authors consider that definitions of 
corruption may be biased in favour of ‘Western standards,’ which are not universally 
applicable in a developing country/emerging economy context and thus overlook the 
fact that whether such “an action is corrupt depends on the social context, within which 
it occurs.” Actions are situationally dependent on their setting, in this case their 
socio/cultural /economic context. For example, in contemporary China, the DaZhong 
taxi company only buys one brand of vehicle, since the city also owns the Shanghai 
Automotive Industry Corporation (SAIC), which in turn manufactures the taxi: “so long 
as the DaZhong buys VW Santanas, there is a good chance that its licence to manage 
the city’s largest fleet of nearly 9000 taxis will be renewed by the city authorities     To 
enter and compete in China you need a licence. To get a licence you need a friend. ” 
(Dunne, M 2011). 
According to Jos (1993), “Identical actions may be totally acceptable in one 
society...and yet be considered corrupt in another,” thus preventing the ‘neutral’ 
observer/commentator from providing an absolute definition of corruption, or avoiding 
cultural bias. Thus when a national daily South African newspaper interviewed nine 
black businessmen from industrial sectors such as infrastructure, property, construction 
and transport (on condition of anonymity), they stated that it was something of a norm 
to “pay to get a tender, pay to be paid, and. grease the 
machinery,” (Rampiedi, P.2012): these just amounted to the hidden transaction costs 
of ‘doing business’ in a developing society. 
Thus despite legislation concerning tenders in government, 34% of all government 
departments awarded contracts to officials and their close family members. Although 
there are a number of initiatives to curb corrupt practices in the public sector, it is 
evident that corruption, in various forms, exists. 
The Public Service Accountability Monitor (PSAM) of the United Nations argues that 
a major obstacle to poor service delivery in South Africa, especially at local government, 
is poor governance, which includes not only corruption, but also poor leadership 
performance by government officials in their management of public resources and a 
lack of political will to act against underperforming officials (Luyt, 2008:2). The poor 
management of public resources, absence of adequate accountability mechanisms and 
a lack of transparency, in turn impact public service delivery (Naidoo 2009). 
In their report of South African local government, the Department of Co-operative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) (2009: 10) identified the following as casual 
reasons for distress in municipal governance: 
 
 Poor ability of councillors to deal with the demands of local government; 
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 Inadequate accountability measures and support systems and resources for 
local democracy; 
 Poor compliance with regulatory and legislative frameworks; 
 Tensions between the political and administrative interface; 
 Lack of clear distinction between the legislative and executive; and 
 Insufficient separations of powers between municipal councils and political 
parties. 
 
Their assessment revealed that party-political factionalism and polarisation has led to 
the deterioration of municipal functionality. These relate to the issues of democracy, 
representation, and inclusion, power sharing and the relationship between institutions 
of governance, such as the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, political parties 
and civil society organisations – all facets of political governance that affect the 
decision-making process that impact individual’s lives, livelihoods and lifestyles (Naidoo 
2009). Nepotism, patronage and corruption leads to a lack of citizenry confidence and 
trust in the system, as the municipal accountability system is perceived to be ineffective 
and inaccessible to many citizens (COGTA, 2009:11). Clearly, greater trust in public 
administration processes is vital (discussed later). 
Of course, examples of corruption and maladministration pervade the world over, 
often on a grander scale than in South Africa, whether it be the corruption conviction 
of Rod Blagojevich, the former Illinois governor, or the municipal bankruptcy of 
Alabama's Jefferson County following a complex $3.14 billion sewer bond debt scandal. 
The reasons are often similar, with links established between corruption and lack of 
ethical leadership and poor governance, (Naidoo 2011; Pillay 2004, Simpson et al. 2012). 
This article discusses certain known corrupt practices that exist in the S.A. public 
sector, and puts forward the argument for ethical leadership to promote good 
governance. Pillay (2004:590) states that success in eradicating corruption depends on 
the promotion of good governance. However, success in promoting good governance 
requires effective leadership (Naidoo 2011), in the form of exemplary moral and ethical 
values. Ethical leadership is needed to resist the abuse of entrusted power for private 
gain, as well as potential interference and to protect anti-corruption agencies’ 
operational independence, in turn facilitating good governance. 
 
2. Preventing Corruption in the South African Public Sector 
 
Various mechanisms and initiatives have been put in place since 1994 to prevent and 
combat corruption in S.A. However, it is also critical to determine their effectiveness in 
relation to the prevention and combating of corruption in the S.A. public sector 
including: 
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2.1 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 
 
Section 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 indicates that 
Public Administration must be governed by democratic values and principles, such as: 
 
 The promotion of a high standard of professional ethics; 
 The promotion of efficient, economic, and effective use of resources; 
 That transparency must be fostered by providing the public with timely, 
accessible and accurate information; and 
 That public administrations must be accountable. 
 
Legislation also exists to translate the principles of the Constitution to promote good 
governance in the public sector. 
 
3. The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act (12 of 2004) outlines a 
framework for the strengthening of measures to prevent and combat corruption, 
provides for investigative measures, places restrictions on persons convicted of corrupt 
activities relating to tenders and contracts, and provides for extra-territorial jurisdiction 
if required. Government and Municipal Departments are required to periodically 
conduct audits of selected projects to identify weaknesses and malpractices in 
procurement processes. However, as was discussed earlier, audit skills and controls are 
often less than robust, especially in the smaller metros. 
 
4. The Protected Disclosures Act 26 of 2000 
 
The Protected Disclosures Act 2000 is intended to protect ‘whistleblowers’ who disclose 
information about unlawful or corrupt conduct against occupational detriment. The Act 
declares that criminal and other irregular conduct in organs of state is detrimental to 
good governance. However, Diale and Holtzhausen (2005:17) state that in its current 
form the Act “falls short of the practicality of its provisions and [lacks protection for] 
current and future whistleblowers.” 
 
5. Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) 
 
The Public Finance Management Act, 1999 (Act 1 of 1999) (PFMA) introduced Tender 
Boards to help monitor the activities supply chain management departments. The 
medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) also compels national government 
departments to budget within strategic goals. 
Section 39 of the Public Finance Management Act, states that the Accounting 
Officer (AO) must exercise tight financial control over expenditure and is obligated to 
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report all financial irregularities to the provincial treasury. Section 40(4) provides for a 
mechanism whereby the AO must report monthly to the Treasury for the previous 
month’s revenue and expenditure. This ensures that expenditure is spread over the 
financial year and can thus prevent ‘fiscal dumping’ at the end of the fiscal year, 
therefore curbing the scope for corruption by limiting the scope for artificially inflating 
budgets and thus promoting better governance. 
 
6. Regulations for Procurement Practices 
 
The Minister of Finance, Pravin Gordhan, in his Budget Speech (2012: 26), reported that 
the ‘National Treasury had issued new regulations which require departments to submit 
annual tender programmes, limit variations to orders, and require disclosure of all 
directives’. 
Other steps that are to be implemented by the National Treasury to improve 
procurement capacity in the public sector include (Gordhan, 2012:26) include: 
 
 Strengthening fragmentation in the system and the national procurement 
architecture; 
 Appointing a Chief Financial Officer (CFO) in the Resource Management (RM) 
Department within the National Treasury to assess the competencies and 
capabilities required by relevant public servants to perform the procurement 
function. 
 Developing a national price reference system, to detect deviations from 
acceptance price; 
 Undertaking a joint review of the validity and cost effectiveness of all 
government property leases; and 
 Improving the ability of departments to set the specifications for tender. 
 
7. Institutions to Curb and Prevent Corruption 
 
‘Doing the right thing’ is often thought to stem from watching others do the ‘right 
thing,’ and in this respect, trust in the both the institutions and the fairness and equity 
of the processes within them is vital, sometimes more than the actual outcomes 
themselves, (Van Ryzin, 2011 745-760). 
In this respect Chapter 9 of the South African Constitution establishes institutional 
safeguards such as the Constitutional Court, the Public Protector, and the Auditor- 
General, all characterised by safeguards on their independence and ability to 
investigate, gather and analyse information, following due process. Amongst various 
so-called ‘Chapter 9’ SA institutions charged with ensuring that public administration 
activities are in line with the values and principles enshrined in the Constitution and 
geared to promoting good governance, are: 
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 The Public Protector, who is mandated to investigate any corruption in state 
affairs, or in public administration, that is alleged or suspected to be improper 
or prejudiced; 
 The Auditor-General (AGSA), who audits and reports on the accounts, financial 
statements and financial management at all levels of government to ensure 
efficiency and economical use of public resources (as previously discussed). 
 
In addition, the Department of Public Service and Administration, oversees the national 
and provincial government; Siswana (2007: 225) adds that ‘in the SA context, it is 
imperative for institutions of governance, such as the Electoral Commission, and Public 
Service Commission (PSC), as well as Parliament and provincial legislatures to enforce, 
securitise and monitor the applications of the above legislative frameworks to instil a 
good governance culture in the public sector. These create conditions for an 
accountable government in the best traditions of democracy. 
It is argued that pre-emptive attention should be devoted to the prevention of 
corruption and to identifying and eliminating systemic regulative and organisational 
lacuna that contribute to corruption. Preventive measures include reforming regulatory 
frameworks to reduce the discretionary powers of public officials, increasing the 
transparency of decision making procedures and improved skills training, particularly 
for those public servants occupying fiscally sensitive positions. More importantly, those 
interacting with the public sector need to be more informed about available protections 
and legislation, as well as the procedures of the Public Finance Management Act 
intended to curb and prevent corruption. 
 
7.1 Manifestations of corruption 
 
Recent information regarding reported public sector corruption in S.A. is reflected in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Corruption in the S.A. public sector for 2004-2010 as at 31 June 2010 
 
 
Categories of corruption Number of 
Occurrences 
Percentages 
Fraud and bribery 1 511 19% 
Mismanagement of government 
funds 
870 11% 
Abuse of government resources 985 13% 
Procurement irregularities 720 9% 
Social Housing allocation 
irregularities 
450 6% 
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Appointment irregularities 627 8% 
Social grant fraud 420 5% 
Identity document fraud 781 10% 
Unethical behaviour 580 8% 
Criminal conduct 512 7% 
Other 310 4% 
Total 7 766 100% 
 
Adapted from the Public Service Commission (PSC) Report 2011 
 
The National Anti-Corruption Review Report in 2004 concluded that although S.A. has 
made great strides in fighting corruption, serious challenges remained in the public 
sector. The report highlighted that corruption in national government had decreased, 
but corruption increased at local government levels (Humphreys & Weinstein 
2009:370). 
Statistics S.A.’s 2011 ‘Victims of Crime Survey’, reported that bribery is the most 
common form of corruption in organs of state: 
 
Households were asked if any public official asked for money, favours or 
a present for a service that he or she was legally required to perform. 5,6% 
of households indicated they were asked for money by government 
officials for a service. The results show that paying a bribe (e.g. to the 
traffic police to avoid traffic fines) was the most common form of 
corruption. Other services where bribes were solicited include those 
involving driver's licences (15,9%), employment applications (13,8%), or 
identity document/passport matters (13,3%). (Statistics S.A.’s Victims of 
crime survey (2011:34) 
 
Although, the proportion of people asked to pay bribes in relation to traffic fines has 
increased since 2007, bribes paid when visiting prisons and involving pension or social 
welfare grants have decreased. 
In closely examining corruption in the provincial sphere in Table 2, it is also 
important to note the relatively small proportion of cases that have been resolved 
through closure. 
 
Table 2. Cases of alleged corruption in provinces: 1 Sept 2004 to 31 June 2010 
 
Province Number 
of cases 
referred 
Feedback 
received 
Percentage 
of feedback 
received 
Cases 
closed 
Percentage 
of cases 
closed 
KwaZulu-Natal 409 191 47% 43 11% 
Free State 203 49 24% 26 13% 
Mpumalanga 791 300 38% 196 25% 
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Western Cape 251 185 73% 30 12% 
North West 307 133 43% 65 21% 
Eastern Cape 424 83 20% 19 4% 
Limpopo 300 96 32% 36 12% 
Northern Cape 70 17 24% 16 23% 
Gauteng 1 188 500 42% 268 23% 
Total 3 949 1 522 39% 699 18% 
 
Adapted from Public Service Commission (2011) 
 
Comparison in Table 2 shows that while certain provinces have proportions of closed 
cases exceeding 20%, other provinces have significantly lower ‘resolutions’ indicating 
inconsistent progress in fighting corruption. Following a National Anti-Corruption 
Summit in 2002, the government adopted a Public Service Anti-Corruption Strategy, 
initiating an anti-corruption hotline in 2004: by 2008, 4,202 cases of alleged corruption 
had been reported to the Public Service Commission (PSC). According to government, 
R86m was recovered through successful investigation and disciplinary procedures, 
though it is hard to know what proportion of losses to the state fiscus remain 
unaccounted for. 
However, a closer look at corruption in 2012 indicates that there have been certain 
egregious breaches. In Limpopo province, five provincial departments were ‘taken over’ 
by national government, as they were deemed not to have the capacity to deliver 
services (Rampedi 2012). A recent Limpopo scandal involved the tendering and 
outsourcing for (non-delivery of thousands of text-books to schools in the 
impoverished and administratively troubled region. Limpopo has a shortfall of more 
than R2bn, an overdraft of R700m and it recently applied to a commercial bank for a 
further overdraft facility, which was declined. 
In Bloemfontein (2012), seven people were recently charged with unlawful practices 
involving tenders in the Free State education department, worth about R30m 
(News24.com: 2012). The Auditor-General (2012) found that over 50% of tenders in the 
province were given either to government workers or their family members. The report 
also stated that “there was still much to be done to address deficient asset management 
processes and practices in the province, while the prevalence and magnitude of 
irregular expenditure incurred by eleven departments and three public entities were 
unacceptably high” (Sowetan 2012). 
Other prominent cases of corruption at national government include the Public 
Works Department that spent money on suspect leases that enriched a privileged few. 
This led to the dismissal of the former Minister of Public Works (Bryson 2011). At local 
government, it is evident that corrupt practices are also on the increase (Smyth, Reddel 
& Jones 2005). For example, a municipal councilor was arrested when he was found by 
the Department of Home Affairs with immigration stamps, allegedly being used on 
travel documents at the border between Zimbabwe and S.A. (News24.com 2012). 
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In light of the above, it is evident that corruption – whether formalised through BEEE 
legislation and policies that leads to company fronting or government tendering and 
outsourcing, characterised by collusion and lack of monitoring skills, or mere bribes, 
lies and falsification – does exist in the S.A. public sector. More seriously, corruption has 
an impact economically, politically and socially, especially on inward investment. 
 
8. Challenges in Addressing Corruption in the Public Sector 
 
Amongst the challenges in addressing corruption, are that public officials enjoy wide 
discretionary powers. Gumede (2011:20) argues that “there are still many ‘legislative 
gaps’ in S.A.’s corruption fighting infrastructure..... relating to how to deal with dual 
employment of public servants, manage conflicts of interest and deal with the ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon, in which senior public servants and politicians, after leaving a job in 
the public and political sector – join the private sector... bringing with them all the inside 
information, contacts and influence”. There is limited capacity in the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to scrutinise disclosures of conflict of interest, as it can only randomly 
scrutinise 30% of all senior managers’ disclosures in the public sector, and has no 
powers of its own to prosecute transgressors. 
Although the Auditor-General investigates corruption, other agencies are required 
to police and prosecute. Integrity committees, for example, cannot investigate cases of 
corruption, neither can they penalise the guilty. The government thus needs to give 
attention to public servants implicated in corruption inquiries, who have apparently not 
faced disciplinary action from within their own departments, perhaps due to limited 
investigative resources and skills. In addition, it can take more than 60 days to finalise 
disciplinary enquiries even for minor offences (Businesslive 2012). This is costly for 
government, as department officials may be suspended from duty with full pay without 
rendering services. It is therefore suggested that the pace of disciplinary hearings 
should be accelerated to prevent cost and time delays. 
It is perhaps not surprising therefore that Independent civil society bodies, such as 
‘Corruption Watch’ have been established (2012), launching a website and SMS hotline 
to receive reports of corruption, a secure portal for evidence-based whistle blowing 
activity and a resource for information about corrupt activities in South Africa. A vocal 
public interest law centre, “SECTION 27,” (named after Section 27 of the South African 
Constitution, which enshrines the country’s commitment to socio- economic rights), has 
also been at the forefront of exposing administrative ills, most recently with the non-
delivery of text books to schools referred to previously. 
Anti-corruption bodies should be shielded from undue political interference. To this 
end, genuine political will to fight corruption is the key prerequisite. Such political will 
must be embedded in a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, in which the level of 
independence can vary according to specific needs and conditions of each department. 
Structural and operational autonomy are important, along with a clear 
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legal mandate. This is particularly important for law enforcement bodies. Transparent 
procedures for appointment and removal of corrupt leaders together with proper 
human resource management and internal controls are important elements to prevent 
undue interference. Independence should not amount to a lack of accountability. 
Although such a body would have to account to politicians, it should not be managed 
by political office bearers, which could affect its independence (Glenister v President of 
the Republic of S.A. and Others, 2011). The principles of the rule of law and human 
rights should be adhered to, with regular performance reports to executive and 
legislative bodies, and public access to information allowed. 
Other aspects of concern are that only 40% of public administration departments 
have anti-corruption policies of reasonable quality, with patchy evidence of 
implementation. The remaining 60% either have no policies, or very basic policies of 
poor quality. Ten percent (10%) of departments have clear written objectives which are 
well integrated with other objectives and with evidence of planning and monitoring 
against objectives. Forty-five percent (45%) of departments have written objectives 
dealing with corruption. Only 15% of the departments were found to have advanced 
investigative capacities, while 25% have basic capacity. The PSC found that many anti-
corruption investigative units established in departments at the provincial level, are 
dysfunctional. The remaining departments were found to have no basic investigative 
capacity (Public Service Commission 2011). 
Departmental feedback reports submitted to the PSC show that departments are 
often lenient, with only written or final warnings to officials found to be associated with 
corruption. The imposition of disciplinary sanctions against officials found guilty of 
corruption is often limited due to weak organisational mechanisms in public sector 
departments. The PSC also found that disciplinary enquiries are very time-consuming, 
(Public Service Commission, 2011). 
There are also challenges around the investigative capabilities of the enforcement 
agencies, (e.g. abuses of power, lack of transparency and openness). There is therefore 
a critical need to address these challenges to curb the prevention of corruption. It 
should be mandatory for investigative units to be established within departments. 
Provinces should establish centralised anti-corruption investigative units. It is suggested 
that Provinces commit greater resources to investigate corruption. In particular, 
integrity management units should be created through the appointment of 
appropriately skilled persons and by training of officials in the discipline of forensic 
investigation. Failure to do so will impact negatively on successful prevention and 
curbing of corruption which will erode efforts to build integrity within the public sector. 
A centralised anti-corruption investigative unit could ensure that there is proper 
coordination of cases in provincial departments and that evidence is not ‘misplaced’ 
(Public Service Commission 2011:ix). 
Currently investigative capacities in the local sphere of government are also 
fragmented and therefore need coordination and integration. The effective utilisation 
of funds and expertise is an important success factor for the local governance 
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framework. Strict adherence to legislation and the Public Finance Act (2002) must be 
ensured. The prevalence of under-spending must be avoided and monitored in relation 
to different projects. Poor financial skills, financial management, lack of financial 
controls, non-adherence to labour policies, dysfunctional labour forums and a 
breakdown in the labour and management interface are features of the majority of 
municipalities who have ‘qualified audits’ or ‘disclaimers’ applied to them (De Lange 
2011). The importance of investing in people is critical, particularly where technical, 
managerial and leadership skills are required (Cooperative Governance and  Traditional 
Affairs 2009). It is also important to promote ethical leadership to curb corruption and 
promote good governance in the public sector. 
 
9. Ethical Leadership to Curb Corruption and Promote Good Governance 
 
Many definitions of leadership exist and it is not the purpose of this article to analyze 
them here, but unique situational factors may be especially relevant in an African 
context. In addition to transformational leadership (Bass et al. 2003), which is especially 
thought to facilitate organizational change and employee satisfaction by looking 
beyond self-interest, to focus on the needs of the organization, and information use is 
thought to help improve the performance of organizations generating and relying on 
data quality (recall the Auditor General’s critique of data from municipalities, discussed 
earlier), (Moynihan et al. 2011), the philosophical traditions of Africa, may offer an 
important contribution to the theory and practice of leadership which can be put into 
practice on a global platform. 
African humanism or ‘Ubuntu’, evokes both reason and empathy as the basis for 
ethical leadership. Ubuntu – articulated in the Zulu proverb umuntu ngumuntu 
ngabantu – means that ‘a person is a person because of other people.’ Khoza (2011) 
contends that the reciprocal relationship between the individual and the social 
collective, stimulates caring and progressive thought and action, which is especially apt 
in the relationship between leader and followers –especially in bureaucratic 
organisations, such as those typified by the public sector. 
While Ngambi’s definition of leadership is relatively conventional, “the process of 
influencing others’ commitment towards realizing their full potential in achieving a 
shared vision, with passion and integrity”, implying a leadership that facilitates self- 
empowerment in followers that inspires passion and compassion, and galvanizes all 
facets of an organisation to function at its maximum potential, it is a precursor for a 
more holistic leadership model requiring that leaders incorporate head, heart and 
hands, into what she terms the “RARE Principles” of Responsible, Accountable, Relevant 
and Ethical leadership. 
Conversely, Ngambi describes a “toxic leadership” intermittently present on the 
African continent, where legacies of empowerment and opportunity have often been 
squandered to kleptocracy, xenophobia and equally toxic “followership.” Recent 
corruption scandals in the public sector where it has been said that those with “the 
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right connections can get a sympathetic hearing from the powers that be,” (Khoza, 
2012), have raised important questions about the role of national leadership in shaping 
ethical conduct, a perception held by Khoza (2012) in criticising contemporary “short-
term, transitional and ethically weak transactional leadership styles.” 
Kroukamp (2011:29) argues that leadership should involve promoting public sector 
ethics. It is further suggested that more emphasis on ethical leadership in the public 
service could curb corruption and ensure good governance. Leadership that is 
participatory, consensus-oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective, 
efficient, equitable and inclusive, following the rule of law, with the views of 
communities taken into account and the voices of the most vulnerable in society heard 
in decision making, it is argued, will help ensure that corruption is minimised. 
According to Van Aswegen and Engelbrecht (2009:228), ethical leadership 
“demonstrates the will and ability to strategically position, design, and sustain an 
organization successfully, to develop employee competence and to direct human and 
organizational energy in pursuit of performance and achievement that stand the ethical 
test of effectiveness and efficiency”. Van Den Akker, Heres, Lasthuizen & Six (2009), 
contend that being an ethical leader is about being both a moral person and a moral 
manager. Ethical leaders increase awareness of what is right, good and important, 
inspiring their followers to become leaders, who go beyond their self- interest for the 
good of the organisation. Palanski and Yammarino (2007), classify the various meanings 
of integrity into five general categories, namely integrity as wholeness, consistency 
between words and actions, integrity as consistency in adversity, integrity as being true 
to oneself, and integrity as moral or ethical behavior. Integrity implies that an 
individual’s behaviour is consistent with espoused moral values, implying that a person 
is honest and trustworthy. According to Van Aswegen and Engelbrecht (2009), most 
scholars consider integrity to be a requirement for ethical and effective leadership. 
Integrity, in particular, is recognised as the core value of leaders. To promote good 
governance, both political and administrative leaders should therefore act with integrity 
at all times and support the ethos of democracy such as that which crafted the 
Constitution of the Republic of S.A. Avey, Palanski and Walumbwa (2010), Walumbwa 
et al., and Neubert, Carlson, Kacmar, Roberts and Chonko (2009) indicate that ethical 
leadership fosters individual perceptions of a  more ethical climate. Ethical leadership 
argue Brown & Treviño, (2006) may portend outcomes, such as followers’ job 
satisfaction and dedication, and their willingness to report problems to management. 
In the African context, Ngambi (2011) highlights the resource of spiritual intelligence 
in the leader-follower relationship. The more ‘spiritually aware’ leader will she argues, 
comprehend their subordinates’ reaction to events or decisions, and at least be aware 
of their feelings. Equally, followers will respect ‘authentic leaders’, who display 
consistently principled behaviour whatever the circumstances. The solution to 
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ethical problems, such as corruption in the S.A. public sector, may therefore rely on a 
spiritually aware moral and competent leadership nexus. 
Given a more ethical leadership, mechanisms of curbing corruption can be 
implemented more vigorously, thus promoting good governance. It is therefore crucial 
that managements create organizational cultures of openness and transparency in 
which unethical conduct becomes visible and employees and managers are 
accountable. In addition, it is suggested that public sector departments need ethical 
training programmes to create and maintain a culture that promotes appropriate 
behavior. However, in a society historically characterized by inequality, between the 
employed, the unemployed and the unemployable, and also amongst the ranks of the 
employed in terms of cultures, education and experience, inculcating a uniform attitude 
to ethical leadership may prove a long and winding path, (see further Zajac and 
Comfort, 1997). 
In order to strengthen the public sector culture, a programme of structural and 
procedural changes could be implemented by management as a means of 
institutionalising ethics (Van Aswegen & Engelbrecht 2009:228). These could include 
formulation of ethical codes and value statements, management and corporate  ethical 
education, public sector ethical performance evaluations, disciplinary codes for 
breaches of procedures, and channels for seeking advice or reporting violations (for 
example support of whistleblowers), ethics ‘hotlines’, conducting ethics audits, scrutiny 
by ethics committees and informational newsletters. However, as has been used to 
describe American CEO Alan Mulally’s leadership philosophy at Ford, (Hoffman, B, 
2012): “The leader’s job is to remind people of that vision, make sure they stick to the 
process and keep them working together,” – which as mentioned above, is often hard to 
achieve, especially in the stratified South African social and organizational contexts. 
Ngambi (2011) also suggests the need for ‘African Intelligence’ (AQ), rooted in 
traditional African community values and the ‘village model’ of leadership, where 
respect and accountability are daily practiced. However, the building of an ethical 
climate in the S.A. public sector requires more than just leaders who behave ethically. It 
requires the proactive management of ethics. Such leaders have to be motivated and 
committed to achieve the vision of an ethical public sector. However, as Zajac  and 
Comfort (1997: 548) remind us: “organizational learning is not always a fully realized 
process. Rather it involves organizational progress through stages of awareness, 
information gathering, inquiry, change, evaluation and revision of action. The extent to 
which organizational learning culminates in actual behavioral change depends in part 
on the mix of receptiveness to, and constraints upon [the] change characteristic of each 
organization.” Overhauling ethics cultures is therefore often hard to achieve in any long 
established organization, especially those practicing public administration. 
South Africa’s journey from restricted access to education, information, opportunities 
and resources, although by now well established, is still an emergent 
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process. The country is still characterized by inequality, patriarchy and hierarchy in an 
almost self-re-enforcing cycle. To import leadership styles and techniques from other 
developed societies, and expect them to transform public administration and service 
delivery in South Africa, does so at the risk of ignoring local history, experience, culture 
and values. To adapt and integrate leadership skills, and at the same time capitalize on 
strongly embedded norms and values discussed above, and apply them to 
contemporary public administration in order to improve attitudes, service, efficiency 
and delivery both towards, and from within, the public service, must surely be the 
ultimate prize, for which to strive. 
 
10. Conclusion 
 
The article presented a background to contemporary public administration in South 
Africa and discussed issues relating to deficiencies, skills, especially as they relate to 
perceptions of and methods to prevent and combat corruption in the S.A. public sector. 
It also explored the challenges to curbing corruption and suggested the critical need 
for ethical leadership to curb corruption and promote good governance in the 
S.A. public sector. 
Despite mechanisms to prevent and curb corruption in the S.A. public sector, it is 
evident that corruption exists. It is apparent that public sector leadership entrusted with 
state resources, enrich themselves instead of acting as custodians of the state and that 
poor governance compounds the corrosive consequences of corruption. This article 
examined corruption and its effects on good governance in the S.A. public sector. The 
article identified corrupt practices in the S.A. public sector and recognised the critical 
need for ethical leadership to curb corruption and promote good governance in S.A. It 
is evident that successful eradication of corruption and promotion of good governance 
therefore depends on ethical leadership. Ethical leadership – with African nuances – is 
therefore suggested to help prevent the abuse of entrusted power for private gain, 
reduce potential interference and protect anti- corruption agencies’ operational 
independence, thus potentially enabling better governance. 
Given the above, it is therefore hoped, that the successful application of ethical 
leadership principles in the context of South African public administration, is in the 
words of a recent patriotic marketing slogan ‘alive with possibility.’ 
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